Signal blocks AI screen capture on iOS and Android
Signal says new iOS and Android protections stop Siri and Gemini from capturing private conversations, although the company warns the safeguards are not complete.
Signal is adding new protections against operating-system AI assistants reading private conversations. The company says its latest changes block screenshots on iOS 27 and detect attempts by AI assistants to capture screen content on supported Android devices.1
The update responds to newer assistant features built into mobile operating systems. Signal specifically points to Apple's Siri AI and Google's Gemini Intelligence, which can read information displayed on screen while carrying out tasks. Signal says that process can move message content outside the app's control and expose it to local or remote systems used by those assistants.1
What Signal is changing
On iOS 27, Signal's protection prevents screenshots of conversations when the setting is enabled. Users can turn the protection off, but Signal warns that doing so may expose message content to AI systems. On Android, the app enables Screen Security when it detects an AI assistant attempting to access the screen. The exact behaviour can vary because Android devices use different system builds and vendor software.1
Signal says its engineers spent months reverse-engineering how these systems access app data and built targeted protections around the paths they could verify. The company also says the defences are incomplete: filesystem access and other routes may still expose data, and Signal cannot currently provide the same screenshot blocking for Siri AI on macOS.1
For macOS 27 users, Signal recommends adding the app to Siri's Excluded Apps list under System Settings. The company is also calling on Apple, Google and Microsoft to publish clearer technical documentation and give developers a reliable opt-out from screen reading, filesystem access, notifications and related operating-system interfaces.1
Why it matters
This is a wider platform problem rather than a small Signal setting. End-to-end encryption protects data while it travels between users, but an operating system assistant that can inspect an unlocked screen operates outside the app's encryption boundary. Signal's response therefore trades some convenience — especially screenshot support on iOS — for a tighter privacy boundary.1
The approach is not a universal fix. Signal says it cannot reliably detect every access method or protect every Android configuration, and its macOS guidance remains a manual exclusion. The useful change is that users now have a clearer control on supported devices, while the bigger question is whether mobile platforms will give privacy-sensitive apps a standard way to refuse AI access.
Our opinion
Signal is right to treat screen-reading assistants as an application privacy issue, not merely an operating-system feature. The screenshot trade-off is awkward, but an explicit choice is better than silent capture. The next step belongs to Apple, Google and Microsoft: developers should not have to reverse-engineer assistants to discover how private messages can be exposed.